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Abstract
This is an examination, a commentary, of links between some philo-
sophical views ascribed to Go¨del and general proof theory. In these
views deduction is of central concern not only in predicate logic, but
in set theory too, understood from an infinitistic ideal perspective. It
is inquired whether this centrality of deduction could also be kept in
the intensional logic of concepts whose building Go¨del seems to have
taken as the main task of logic for the future.
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1 Introduction
This paper is an attempt to find links between Go¨del’s philosophical views
and general proof theory (and even proof-theoretic semantics; see the end
of Section 4 below). This attempt is not based on the published works
of Go¨del, but on the record of his views in [Wang 1996], which cannot be
accepted without reservation. It is however quite astonishing how some of
the views ascribed to Go¨del accord well with the perspective of general proof
theory (see Section 3). Deduction is of central concern for Go¨del not only
in predicate logic, but, according to [Wang 1996], he adopts this perspective
even for set theory, as a kind of ideal infinitistic extrapolation, inspired to a
certain extent by Russell’s no class theory (see Section 4).
Words ascribed to Go¨del concerning these matters, which we examine
and comment upon here, are not many, but they are quite suggestive. It
is to be hoped that the unpublished Nachlass of Go¨del will yield further
confirmation of what these words suggest. It can document at least how
Go¨del relied on Gentzen’s sequents in the second and last elementary logic
course he delivered in his life, which we believe is not a slight matter (see
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Section 2). We consider at the end whether a link between Go¨del’s views
and general proof theory should be expected also in the logic of concepts,
the intensional logic whose building Go¨del seems to have taken as the main
task of logic for the future (see Section 5). Although there is much emphasis
in words ascribed to Go¨del concerning this task, not many details about its
realization are given.
2 Go¨del’s interest in sequents
Go¨del’s name is one of the most often, if not the most often, mentioned in
the field of proof theory that has grown out of Hilbert’s program and the
quest for consistency proofs. It is however far less often mentioned in general
proof theory that has grown out of Gentzen’s work on the normal form of
proofs, which starts with Gentzen’s doctoral thesis [Gentzen 1935], and has
been pursued by Dag Prawitz in [Prawitz 1965]. Go¨del’s technical results on
intuitionism from the early thirties would be mentioned in this other field
of proof theory (among them those on the double-negation translation of
[Go¨del 1933], which overlap with results independently reached by Gentzen
in [Gentzen 1933]), but these results are not of the kind central in the field.
It should not be a surprise that Go¨del paid no doubt close attention
to Gentzen’s consistency proof for formal arithmetic, in both versions. In
[Go¨del 1938] Go¨del discusses the first published version of [Gentzen 1936],
and notes at the end that the mathematical significance of Gentzen’s work is
“tatsa¨chlich außenordentlich groß [in fact extraordinarily great]”, while the
version of [Gentzen 1938] is considered in [Go¨del 1953/9] (§24). Bernays and
Gentzen are called “leading proponents of formalism” at the same place (and
“leading formalists” in the Gibbs lecture [Go¨del 1951], p. 318, fn 27). Georg
Kreisel testifies in [Kreisel 1987] (Note 7(d)(i), p. 169): “[Go¨del] often called
Gentzen a better logician than himself.” If we realize that, according to what
is known today, Go¨del in general did not make many compliments concerning
logicians who were his contemporaries, what is mentioned in this paragraph
gains in importance.
It is however not well known that Go¨del had a favourable opinion about
Gentzen’s presentation of logic with sequents. It is recorded in [Dawson 1997]
(p. 136) that in the elementary logic course he gave in the spring of 1939 at
the University of Notre Dame his aim was “to give, as far as possible, a com-
plete theory of logical inferences and logically true propositions, and to show
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how they can be reduced to a certain number of primitive laws” (the text
under quotes here, and in the remainder of this paragraph, is from Go¨del’s
notes; see Extract 1 in [Cassou-Nogue`s 2009], p. 78). After that, one can
find at the same place that after giving an axiomatization of propositional
logic derived from Russell, and proving in particular completeness, he noted
that although Russell’s axiomatization had become the standard for text-
books, it is “open to some objections from the aesthetic point of view” (see
[Cassou-Nogue`s 2009], p. 70). Go¨del pointed out that statements taken as
axioms “should be as simple and evident as possible... [certainly] simpler
than the theorems to be proved, whereas in [Russell’s] system... the very
simple law of identity p ⊃ p” was a theorem rather than an axiom (the text
quoted here from Go¨del’s notes is from [Dawson 1997]; a slightly different
rendering is in [Cassou-Nogue`s 2009], p. 70). It is reported at the same place
that Go¨del then turned towards Gentzen’s sequents to give an alternative
formulation that he regarded as more satisfactory.
This paper, and also the present section, were written without our hav-
ing been acquainted with Go¨del’s unpublished notes for his Notre Dame
course. In a companion to this paper [D.&A. 2016a], written after gaining
this acquaintance, we present Go¨del’s system of propositional logic based
on sequents and, to provide a context for it, we summarize briefly Go¨del’s
course, which we present with more detail and comments in another compan-
ion [A.&D. 2016]. We also make there comments upon the course and upon
Go¨del’s system with sequents, and we reexamine in the light of the notes
matters considered in this section.
Besides the elementary logic course at Notre Dame, Go¨del gave an elemen-
tary logic course in Vienna in 1935, which is briefly described in [Dawson 2005]
(p. 153). At the same place, one can find another brief description of the
notes for the Notre Dame course, and Gentzen’s sequents are again men-
tioned. They are also mentioned in [Dawson] (p. 8), where there are further
details about Go¨del’s time at Notre Dame. Three extracts from Go¨del’s notes
for the Notre Dame course are published in [Cassou-Nogue`s 2009]. Go¨del’s
way of presenting logic with sequents is mentioned in the summary and com-
ments preceding the extracts (p. 70, to which we referred above), but the
part of the notes with this presentation was not chosen for printing.
Could one assume that Go¨del thought that the advantage of Gentzen’s
presentation of logic in terms of sequents is merely aesthetic? As if this
aesthetic advantage was a secondary matter, not touching upon the real,
primary, goal of logic. For Go¨del, the primary goal of logic, as for mathe-
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matics in general, could no doubt be described as reaching the truth about
the matters it studies, and this is so from his youth on (see [Go¨del 2003],
pp. 447, point 8, and p. 450, point 8(b), and [Go¨del 2003a], pp. 397-398,
401, 403-405; the gist of these letters of Go¨del may also be found printed in
[Wang 1974], pp. 8-11). The question is whether reaching this primary goal
is separable from reaching the secondary one. Can one reach true, correct,
mathematics without at the same time reaching mathematical beauty? Per-
haps yes, though one could always blame the failure to reach beauty upon
the weakness of men—their inability to recognize it, or to find the right or
exact formulation to make it manifest. What however seems impossible is to
reach beauty in mathematics without having reached truth. Beautiful incor-
rect mathematics is out of the question. Its beauty would be false, and not
real.
Real beauty is for mathematicians inseparable from truth, but, more than
that, it is a sign of truth, and moreover of important truth. This is not a
peculiarly Go¨delian point of view, and many, if not most, mathematicians
certainly have it. Go¨del has however an explicit relevant statement, taken
from a very nice section of his unpublished notes, written a few years after
the Notre Dame course:
The truth is what has the simplest and the most beautiful symbolic
expression.
(The translation of this sentence from [Go¨del], p. [18], is from [Kostic´ 2015],
Section 4.2.) This sentence could say more than that simplicity and beauty
are a sufficient condition for truth, and a sign of it. It could say in addition
that they are a necessary condition for truth.
Go¨del has probably kept the same opinion until his old age, according to
the following, which are his words as recorded in [Wang 1996] (Chapter 4,
Section 4.4, p. 151), and are nice too:
4.4.18 In principle, we can know all of mathematics. It is given
to us in its entirety and does not change—unlike the Milky Way.
That part of it of which we have a perfect view seems beauti-
ful, suggesting harmony; that is, that all the parts fit together
although we see fragments of them only. Inductive inference is
not like mathematical reasoning: it is based on equality or uni-
formity. But mathematics is applied to the real world and has
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proved fruitful. This suggests that the mathematical and the em-
pirical parts are in harmony and the real world is also beautiful.
Otherwise mathematics would be just an ornament and the real
world would be like an ugly body in beautiful clothing.
In this vein, which leads to Plato, and seems to have been congenial to
Go¨del all his life, truth and beauty, although different, would be indissolubly
linked. (Goodness is not mentioned here.) One could perhaps say that,
although truth and beauty are intensionally different, they are extensionally
equivalent.
Go¨del’s sentence first quoted above may also suggest something that pre-
sumably was not Go¨del’s position—namely, that truth amounts to simplicity
and beauty, that it reduces to them, that it is defined by them. As a for-
malist in the philosophy of mathematics could replace truth by utility, so an
aestheticist in this philosophy, who may, but perhaps need not, be related
to the formalist, could replace truth by beauty. The converse reduction of
beauty to truth seems to amount to the rejection of beauty as a viable sub-
ject in the philosophy of mathematics. In fact, much of the philosophy of
mathematics shares with this anti-aestheticism the neglect of beauty.
Be that as it may, it seems safe to say that Go¨del was not making a
slight compliment to Gentzen. This matter interests us here, because we
may tie it with a rather plausible assumption. The assumption is that Go¨del
understood sequents as saying something about deductions, and not as a pe-
culiar way to write implications. This flattened understanding of sequents as
implications may be found, for example, in [Church 1956] (§29 and §39.11).
Gentzen himself in his thesis [Gentzen 1935] (Sections I.2.4 and III.1.1) rec-
ommends such an understanding, and calls it “inhaltlich” (translated as “in-
formal” in [Gentzen 1969] and “intuitive” in [Gentzen 1955], but “soderzha-
tel’ny˘ı” in [Idel’son & Mints 1967]). The connection of sequents with natural
deduction, from which they stem, and what Gentzen does with them, sug-
gest strongly that they should be understood as being about deductions, as
indeed many of those who worked with them in the last decades understood
them.
We speak of deduction, and not consequence, because understanding se-
quents as being about consequence would not be going far away from the
flattened reading of sequents as implications. (Section 4 of [D. 2011] raises
the question whether deduction, implication and consequence have inhaltlich
the same meaning.) Strictly speaking, Gentzen does not go beyond taking
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sequents as partaking in a consequence relation, but his deep concentration
on normal form, i.e. cut elimination, foreshadows another direction of re-
search. This is the taking of the reflexive, symmetric and transitive closure
of the reducibility relation involved in reaching the normal form as a signifi-
cant equivalence relation on derivations. The first answer to the question of
identity criteria for deductions—perhaps the main technical question of gen-
eral proof theory—is obtained by taking deductions as equivalence classes
of derivations (see [D. 2003], §2, and [D. & Petric´ 2004], Chapter 1, §1.3).
The question and the answer are not exactly in Gentzen’s writings, but he
points very much in that direction. He has a good feeling for the subject,
and by pursuing his own goals, which besides a proof of consistency may
be also beauty, he prepares well the ground for these investigations that in
his time belonged to the future, and are still not entirely accomplished and
acknowledged.
How well Gentzen was pointing in the direction of general proof theory
becomes clear when one compares his approach to consequence based on se-
quents to Tarski’s approach based on the Cn consequence operation (these
matters are considered in [D. 1997], Section 2, where one can also find refer-
ences to the relevant papers of Tarski, which are translated in [Tarski 1956]).
In principle, the two formalisms are intertranslatable, but with Tarski’s it is
hard to imagine how one could reach the idea of normal form for deductions,
and how one could adapt Cn to study identity of deduction.
To ascribe to Go¨del the ability to recognize to a certain extent in se-
quents their potential for doing interesting and nice mathematics about
deductions does not seem far-fetched. The same ability could be ascribed
rather plausibly to Kleene, somebody from Go¨del’s milieu in America (see
[Kleene 1987]), who published not much later his book [Kleene 1952]. Much
of Chapter XV of that book is devoted to Gentzen’s sequents, and Kleene’s
paper [Kleene 1952a], published the same year, is practically about identity
of deductions within Gentzen’s sequent systems. The same ability could
also be ascribed to Bernays, who supervised Gentzen’s work on his thesis
[Gentzen 1935] and his later work, and with whom Go¨del corresponded ex-
tensively for 45 years (see [Go¨del 2003], pp. 40-313).
Although Go¨del’s contribution to logic was not about deduction, in state-
ments he made in philosophical conversations in his old age, which are
recorded in [Wang 1996], deduction became important, and we will consider
this matter in the next section.
7
3 Logic and deduction
Let us note first that, instead of the term deduction, in the words of Go¨del
recorded in [Wang 1996] one finds rather the term inference. We will here
take these two terms as synonymous. In general, we favour the term de-
duction, because we believe that it has less psychologistic overtones (see
[D. 2011], Section 3). We believe that a psychologistic interpretation of in-
ference or deduction does not accord with Go¨del’s ideas, as we will try to
show at the end of the paper in Section 5.
The most explicit mentioning of the role of deduction, i.e. inference, in
logic that we have found in [Wang 1996] is in the following fragments (from
Chapter 8, Section 8.1, pp. 266-267):
8.4.11 The propositional calculus is about language or deals
with the original notion of language: truth, falsity, inference. . . .
8.4.12 One idea is to say that the function of logic is to allow us
to draw inferences. If we define logic by formal evidence directly
concerning inference for the finite mind, then there is only one
natural choice and it is not natural to treat the infinite as a part
of logic. The part of formal inference or formal theory for the
finite mind incorporates inferences. The completeness proof of
predicate logic confirms its adequacy to this conception of logic.
. . .
8.4.14 In contrast to set theory, predicate logic is mainly a
matter of rules of inference. It is unnatural to use axioms in it.
For the infinite mind, the axioms of set theory are also rules of
inference. . . .
8.4.15 Lower functional calculus [predicate logic] consists of
rules of inference. It is not natural to use axioms. It is logic for
the finite mind. . . . For the infinite mind, axioms of set theory
are also rules of inference.
8.4.16 For the empiricists, the function of logic is to allow us
to draw inferences. It is not to state propositions, but to go
over from some propositions to some other propositions. For a
theoretical thinker, the propositions embodying such inferences
(or implications) are also of interest in themselves.
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The omitted fragment 8.4.13 of this series is about probability, which is
not our concern here. We have not quoted the remaining fragments in full,
except for the last one. The omitted portions are about matters that, as
8.4.13, are not our concern here: Aristotle, the necessity modal operator, the
quantifiers “most”, “many” and “some (in the sense of plurality)” (what is
exactly this last quantifier is not quite clear), and the need for quantifiers to
be able to talk about objects. We omitted from 8.4.14 an interesting claim
that according to Bernays mathematics is more abstract than logic, in which
we find concepts with content, while in mathematics the concepts of group
and field are purely formal. Logic, including its intensional part, the logic of
concepts, is characterized in 8.4.18 [part I] (see Section 5 below) as the theory
of the formal.
The term formal is also used in the quotation from 8.4.12 above. Later
in the paper, in Section 5, we will return to what is expressed with this term
in that quotation, and also to something else omitted from 8.4.14, which has
to do with the logic of concepts. The connection of all that with deduction
is not clear.
A warning is now in order concerning the authenticity of these words. A
similar warning is made in [Wang 1996] (in Chapter 4, p. 137) by Hao Wang
himself, the author of that book, and in [Parsons 1998] (Section 5, p. 20). The
words quoted above were not written by Go¨del. They come from the notes of
conversations with Go¨del taken by Hao Wang, who in [Wang 1996] says on
p. 131: “Following each of these ‘conversations’, I wrote up his ideas in my
own words, and we discussed the fragments I had thus produced”. It seems
however that each in the context where it occurs should not be understood
as applying to all the conversations. Hao Wang says on the same page and
on p. 137 that the conversations in 1975 and 1976 were usually on the phone,
and at the later page he also says: “I sent him written versions of some parts
of our discussions so that he could comment on them in our next telephone
call. Some of my reports of his sayings in this book are, therefore in a form
that he approved of; other parts he read but was not satisfied with, even
though he recognized them as his own statements. (In these cases he seemed
to expect, or hope, that I would come up with a clearer exposition than his
own.) Still other parts were never seen by him. Therefore, he probably would
not have wished to publish much of the material in the form I ‘quote’, and
it is quite possible that there are places where I am mistaken about what
he actually said.” On p. 130 Hao Wang says: “I have reconstructed these
conversations in several versions, based on very incomplete notes, in an effort
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(only partially successful) to interpret them and place them in perspective.”
The publication of the notes in Go¨del’s Nachlass that he wrote in shorthand
for himself may show how much Hao Wang was successful. Sometimes the
several versions he mentions are not clearly consistent with each other. We
are however not aware that what we quoted has been contradicted elsewhere
by words ascribed to Go¨del.
The most important question for us that may be raised concerning the
quotations above is what is meant there by inference. What formalism is
envisaged?
We think that the formalism that fits best the quoted words is that of
Gentzen’s sequents, which as we have seen in the preceding section interested
Go¨del since his young age. An interpretation based on natural deduction
would also be possible, but would not be essentially different, since sequents
should be taken here as providing only a more precise record of deductions.
The theoretical thinker’s “propositions embodying such inferences (or im-
plications)” from the last quoted fragment 8.4.16 could be understood as
sequents. Moreover, this could well be sequents interpreted as being about
deduction, and not about consequence (see the last part of the preceding
section). The appearance of the parenthetical implications may perhaps be
taken as a misnomer, coming from a misunderstanding, an unfortunate trans-
lation, or a dissatisfaction with the term sequent, due to Go¨del himself. (This
term does not occur in [Wang 1996].) Gentzen, and many others following
his usage, write an arrow to separate the left-hand side of sequents from the
right-hand side, and this arrow is often used for the implication connective
by Go¨del (see [Go¨del 1986] and [Go¨del 1990]) and others. As we have seen
in the preceding section, Gentzen himself at the beginning of his thesis did
not understand sequents as “inhaltlich” different from implications.
It is very natural to assume that Go¨del would not think about deductions
without thinking also about the rules that justify them, and the “formal
evidence directly concerning inference” in the quotation from 8.4.12 above
may be understood as concerning not only formal sequent systems, but also
rules of deduction. Rules of deduction are explicitly mentioned in 8.4.14 and
8.4.15. Could one try to adduce this as “informal” evidence for the ability
that we ascribed to Go¨del towards the end of the preceding section, which
is the ability to recognize in sequents their potential for the investigations
of general proof theory? Taking serious account of the rules of deduction is
an essential matter in the study of identity criteria for deduction, which we
mentioned there, and which is pursued as one of the main tasks of general
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proof theory. The interesting and important thing for us here is not that
Go¨del thought about rules of deduction, but that in 8.4.12 he proposes to
“define logic by formal evidence directly concerning inference for the finite
mind”.
An interpretation of our quotations in terms of sequents makes sense
everywhere, except for one sentence. Let us first note that what we have
quoted from 8.4.14 is quite similar to what we have quoted from 8.4.15,
although the former fragment is said to be from 1971 and the latter from
1976. This repetition of the same point after several years may be a sign
of its importance for Go¨del, and may corroborate its authenticity, or it may
have just been imported in one of the quotations either from the past or
from the future. The first part of these quotations about predicate logic fits
rather well with the interpretation with sequents understood as being about
deductions.
Note then that the last sentence of the first quotation is practically the
same as the last sentence of the second quotation. (Does this corroborate
authenticity even more, or is it an even stronger sign of importation from
the past or the future?) We will consider closely in the next section this
sentence, which is difficult to understand.
4 Set theory and deduction
The last sentence of our quotation from 8.4.14 in the last section is, modulo
the disappearance of a definite article, the same as the last sentence of 8.4.15,
and this sentence is:
For the infinite mind, [the] axioms of set theory are also rules of
inference.
At first glance, this is obscure. Perhaps some critiques of Go¨del could even
accuse him here of mysticism, as he was accused concerning his epistemology
of mathematics. (An example of a rather intemperate, but not atypical,
accusation of this kind is in [Chihara 1990], Section I.3, p. 21.)
A clue for a reasonable interpretation of this sentence is suggested by
the following quotation from [Wang 1996] (p. 268), which is just a few lines
below the quotations of the preceding section:
8.4.18 [part II] . . . Elementary logic is the logic for finite minds.
If you have an infinite mind, you have set theory. For exam-
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ple, set theory for a finite universe of ten thousand elements is
part of elementary logic; compare my Russell paper (probably
[Go¨del 1944]).
The relevant quotation from [Go¨del 1944] (p. 144, in [Go¨del 1990], p. 134) to
which Go¨del, according to Hao Wang, presumably refers, is the following:
. . . [Ramsey 1926] took the course of considering our inability
to form propositions of infinite length as a “mere accident”, to
be neglected by the logician. This of course solves (or rather
cuts through) the difficulties; but [it] is to be noted that, if one
disregards the difference between finite and infinite in this re-
spect, there exists a simpler and at the same time more far reach-
ing interpretation of set theory (and therewith of mathematics).
Namely, in case of a finite number of individuals, Russell’s aperc¸u
that propositions about classes can be interpreted as propositions
about their elements becomes literally true, since, e.g., “x ∈ m”
is equivalent to
“x = a1 ∨ x = a2 ∨ . . . ∨ x = ak”
where the ai are the elements of m; and “there exists a class such
that . . . ” is equivalent to “there exist individuals x1, x2, . . . , xn
such that . . . ”, {footnote 36: The xi may, of course, as always,
be partly or wholly identical with each other.} provided n is the
number of individuals in the world and provided we neglect for
the moment the null class which would have to be taken care of by
an additional clause. Of course, by an iteration of this procedure
one can obtain classes of classes, etc., so that the logical system
obtained would resemble the theory of simple types except for the
circumstance that mixture of types would be possible. Axiomatic
set theory appears, then, as an extrapolation of this scheme for
the case of infinitely many individuals or an infinite iteration of
the process of forming sets.
Note that in the last quotation Go¨del speaks of classes, rather than sets,
which are mentioned only at the end, but at the same time he speaks about
“set theory”, mentioning it twice.
We will not try to reconstruct precisely the reduction of set theory for a
finite universe to logic according to this sketch of Go¨del, which comes after
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his discussion of Russell’s “no class theory”, by which it is inspired. We will
however make a few comments on this reduction. (Go¨del’s set theory for a
finite universe should not be confused with finitary set theory, which amounts
to arithmetic, and where the individuals are finite sets, but the universe may
be infinite; see [Kirby 2009] and references therein, and also [Cohen 1966],
Section I.6).
One might expect that formally this reduction is a translation, i.e. a one-
one map, from the language of set theory to a purely logical language. It is not
clear what is in general a translation in logic. It is presumably not any one-
one map. Sometimes it is required that it should, partly or totally, preserve
meaning, and this preservation is often thought to be accomplished by an
inductive definition of the map, which makes of it a kind of homomorphism.
It is however far from clear that any such inductive definition will guarantee
preservation of meaning, which is anyway not a clear concept, as Go¨del might
say (see the next section below). It is also not clear that the ∈-elimination
translation suggested by Go¨del should be defined inductively.
To suggest the difficulties of an inductive definition of such a translation
τ , let E be the axiom of extensionality:
∀x∀y(∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y)→ x = y),
which should hold in every finite universe of sets, as well as in every universe
of sets, and consider how we could obtain τ(E). If E ′ is ∀z(z ∈ x↔ z ∈ y),
the antecedent of the implication prefixed in E by ∀x∀y, then τ(E ′) would
presumably be:
∀z((z = x1 ∨ . . . ∨ z = xn)↔ (z = y1 ∨ . . . ∨ z = yn)),
but what would then be τ(x = y)? We cannot just leave τ(x = y) to be x = y,
because we want τ(E) to hold in our universe. We must say in τ(x = y)
something about the xi and the yj. Perhaps τ(x = y) should be just τ(E
′),
which would have the advantage of transforming the axiom of extensionality
into the logical truth that is the universal closure of τ(E ′)→ τ(E ′). This kind
of translation cannot however be given in a context-independent manner, and
it is not clear how to define it inductively.
Go¨del’s translation τ would presumably be expected to preserve meaning
totally. Does it do that if τ(E) is the universal closure τ(E ′) → τ(E ′)? Do
E and τ(E) have the same meaning? The sentence τ(E) is tautologous,
whereas E does not seem so.
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If not equality of meaning, will the translation τ guarantee at least the
equivalence mentioned by Go¨del? What is exactly this equivalence? This is
not a straightforward matter. Go¨del suggests that τ(∀x∃m(x ∈ m)) should
be the formula:
∀x∃x1 . . .∃xn(x = x1 ∨ . . . ∨ x = xn).
The last formula, which can be derived from x = x, is logically valid, but
∀x∃m(x ∈ m) will not hold if the number of individuals is finite and there is
no infinite descending sequence of elements (as should be the case according
to Go¨del’s remark in the quotation about the resemblance with type theory).
So equivalence cannot mean that for every formula A we have that A holds
in a finite universe if and only if τ(A) holds in this universe.
What does equivalence mean then? Should one state something weaker?
Perhaps that for every formula A we have just the implication that if A holds
in a finite universe, then τ(A) holds in this universe?
Instead of expecting a translation result, one could understand Go¨del’s
appeal to equivalence just as an admonition: “Leave aside the mentioning
of classes, and mention just individuals.” Russell’s no class theory, although
called a theory (Go¨del seems to call it also an aperc¸u), could perhaps be un-
derstood in a similar manner. To justify this admonition one could rely on
something like the implication of the preceding paragraph. Such an impli-
cation is sufficient to guarantee that by translating we cannot err, although
identity of meaning is doubtful. We cannot fall from truth to falsehood,
which is the most important thing for us if we are extensionally-minded.
Anyway, Go¨del in the last two quotations seems to suggest that as set
theory for a finite universe reduces to logic, so set theory in general by “an
extrapolation of this scheme for the case of infinitely many individuals” re-
duces to logic. And logic is about deduction, as stated in the quotations from
the preceding section. The axioms for ∈ will then be replaced by deduction
rules for disjunction, maybe infinite. These are rules like introduction of
disjunction and elimination of disjunction in natural deduction, or rules like
introduction of disjunction on the right-hand side of a sequent and introduc-
tion of disjunction on the left-hand side of a sequent. This is what ∈ reduces
to for an infinite mind.
This is how the sentence quoted at the beginning of this section can
be understood reasonably, in a manner pointing towards general proof the-
ory. As the rest of the quotations considered in the preceding section, it
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could also be taken as pointing in fact towards proof-theoretic semantics (see
[Schroeder-Heister 2016]).
Whether the reduction of set theory to logic preserves meaning is however
doubtful, as we suggested above. One could perhaps expect an answer in the
logic of concepts that Go¨del was hoping for, which we will briefly examine in
the next section.
5 Concepts and deduction
A great deal of the records of Hao Wang in [Wang 1996] of his conversations
with Go¨del is about views ascribed to Go¨del concerning the logic that should
be developed in the future. This applies in particular to Chapter 8, from
which we have been quoting in the preceding two sections, but it applies as
well to many other places in the book. On can hope that similar views may
be found, at least to a certain extent, in Go¨del’s still unpublished, rather
considerable, Nachlass. It would be interesting to systematize this matter,
but before the complete publication of the Nachlass, it might be premature
to attempt that. Anyway, it would be too ambitious for us, taking account of
our knowledge, and of the space left to us here. All that we venture to do in
this closing section is to give a few remarks about the role deduction might
play in Go¨del’s logic of concepts, the building of which should be the main
task of logic for the future. (In [Crocco 2006] Go¨del’s views on concepts are
considered in the historical perspective provided by related views of Frege
and Russell.)
Go¨del was hoping for a logic that will include an intensional theory dealing
with concepts, with which he will be able to go beyond the limits of the exist-
ing extensional theory. This intensional theory, which will presumably strive
for completeness, will not shun away from self-reference, as the extensional
theory must do, but it is not clear how the intensional theory will prevent
self-referential paradoxes to produce contradiction in it (see [Wang 1996],
8.4.19, p. 268, and pp. 278-279).
Go¨del found self-reference very productive and took it as a very important
tool, with which a theory gains strength. This is suggested by the following
quotation ([Wang 1996], p. 139):
4.3.5 Category theory is built up for the purpose of proving
set theory inadequate. It is more interested in feasible formu-
lations of certain mathematical arguments which apparently use
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self-reference. Set theory approaches contradictions to get its
strength.
This is one of the very rare remarks ascribed to Go¨del that mention category
theory. Can one infer from it that category theory is suggested as a guide
for the intensional theory of concepts?
We should not relinquish the precious tool that self-reference is if contra-
diction does not arise. This attitude of Go¨del is not surprising, since both
Cantor’s proof of the nonenumerability of the reals, as well as Go¨del’s own
incompleteness results, involve self-reference in their core. Besides in these
two, most famous and important, cases one can no doubt find self-reference
applied fruitfully in many other cases. For example, passing from an ordinal
α to its successor α ∪ {α} may be described picturesquely as follows: “The
ordinal α becomes conscious of itself and adds itself to its elements.” (The
finitary set theory of [Kirby 2009], mentioned in the preceding section in a
parenthetical remark after the quotation from [Go¨del 1944], is based on a
generalization of this successor operation.)
To accommodate self-reference, Go¨del took Church’s formal system of
[Church 1932] and [Church 1933], based on lambda abstraction and appli-
cation with no types, as a step in the right direction in formulating the
logic of concepts (see the references concerning paradoxes before the quota-
tion above). Although Church’s system was soon to be shown inconsistent
in [Kleene & Rosser 1935], the possibility remained that one could devise a
more satisfactory, consistent, system for the logic of concepts based on similar
ideas (see [Wang 1996], 8.4.19, p. 268, which we mentioned above).
In the draft of a letter of 1963 written presumably to the theologian Paul
Tillich, Go¨del mentions self-reference in the guise of self-knowledge in an even
more philosophical context (see [van Atten 2006], pp. 259-260; we correct in
our quotation some obvious lapses of the draft, and omit most of the editorial
apparatus, including footnotes):
It occurred to me that in our conversation of last Sunday I an-
swered one of your questions incompletely. I said that in mathe-
matical reasoning the non-computational (i.e. intuitive) element
consists in intuitions of higher and higher infinities. This is quite
true, but this situation can be further analysed, and then it turns
out that they result (as becomes perfectly clear when these things
are carried out in detail) from a deeper and deeper self-knowledge
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of reason [to be more precise from a more and more complete ra-
tional knowledge of the essence of reason (of which essence the
faculty of self-knowledge is itself a constituent part)] . . .
Let us turn now to the existing extensional theory of logic. It is under-
stood very widely, as in the following quotation, giving the missing part of
8.4.18, of which we have mentioned the later [part II] in the preceding section
([Wang 1996], p. 268):
8.4.18 [part I] Logic is the theory of the formal. It consists of set
theory and the theory of concepts. The distinction between ele-
mentary (or predicate) logic, nonelementary logic, and set theory
is a subjective distinction. Subjective distinctions are dependent
on particular forms of the mind. What is formal has nothing
to do with the mind. Hence, what logic is is an objective issue.
Objective logical implication is categorical. . . .
We will first comment upon the first two sentences of this quotation. The
extensional theory includes predicate logic and set theory. To treat matters
extensionally is the way mathematics does it ([Wang 1996], Section 8.6, p.
274):
8.6.2 Mathematicians are primarily interested in extensions and
we have a systematic study of extensions in set theory, which re-
mains a mathematical subject except in its foundations. Math-
ematicians form and use concepts, but they do not investigate
generally how concepts are formed, as is to be done in logic. We
do not have an equally well-developed theory of concepts compa-
rable to set theory. At least at the present stage of development, a
theory of concepts does not promise to be a mathematical subject
as much as set theory is one.
The existing extensional predicate logic is about deduction, as we saw
in Section 3, and, from an infinitary point of view, set theory is also about
deduction, as we saw in the preceding section. So extensionality accords
well with deduction. What about the intensional logic of concepts? Will it
involve deduction too? The following quotation ([Wang 1996], p. 267), which
is in the missing part of fragment 8.4.14, from which we quoted in Section 3,
makes this doubtful:
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The whole of set theory is within the purely formal domain.
We have a distinction of two kinds of higher functional calcu-
lus [higher-order logic]: in terms of inferences and in terms of
concepts.
That set theory is formal should mean that it is all within logic, as told
in the first two sentences of 8.4.18 [part I] above. Set theory is extensional,
and besides it we should have in logic the intensional theory of concepts. If
“in terms of concepts” stands for “intensional”, then it is as if “in terms of
inference” stands for “extensional”. “In terms of concepts” does not then
announce an involvement with deduction.
On the other hand, the end of 8.4.18 [part I] above may suggest something
else:
. . . what logic is is an objective issue. Objective logical implica-
tion is categorical.
The objective logical implicationmentioned here could perhaps be understood
as stemming out of deduction. We have mentioned implication as a possible
misnomer for sequent in Section 3, in connection with 8.4.16.
Would Go¨del insist here on the objectivity of implication if he had in mind
material implication? The truth value of such an implication is a function of
the truth values of the antecedent and the consequent, and is determined out
of these truth values quite independently of the human mind. What would
it mean to say that material implication is subjective? Who ever thought it
is that?
Does Go¨del think here about intuitionistic implication? Maybe he does,
but then he might as well have spoken about deduction, to which this im-
plication is closely tied. Intuitionistic implication is characterized through
Gentzen’s natural-deduction introduction and elimination rules, or sequent
rules which amount to these. In terms of category theory, there is behind this
characterization an adjoint situation revealed by Lawvere in [Lawvere 1969],
i.e. a natural one-to-one correspondence between deductions from A ∧ C to
B and those from C to A→ B, which shows in what precise sense intuition-
istic implication is a mirror of deduction (for related matters and further
references see [D. 2001] or [D. 2006]).
It would be very surprising if “categorical” in the quotation above had
to do with this characterization in terms of category theory, although such
an interpretation makes perfect sense. It would make more sense, and would
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be more interesting, than taking this adjective to mean simply something
like “unconditional”. (The characterization in terms of category theory of
“objective” mathematical structures that deductions make is examined in
[D. 2016].)
The deductions of classical logic associated to Gentzen’s plural sequents,
with possibly multiple right-hand sides, are studied in terms of category
theory in [D. & Petric´ 2004] (in particular in Chapters 11 and 14). These
deductions, which one might sensibly call objective, need not be taken as
mirrored by material implication in an adjoint situation, as intuitionistic
deductions are mirrored by intuitionistic implication.
Understanding the objectivity of implication, or deduction, as rejecting
its psychologistic interpretation makes the quotation above sensible and in-
teresting. This understanding accords well with what precedes this statement
of objectivity: “Subjective distinctions are dependent on particular forms of
the mind. What is formal has nothing to do with the mind.” The rejection of
psychologism with respect to deduction is something we mentioned briefly at
the beginning of Section 3 (and we gave a reference concerning that matter).
Will objective deductions be represented in the logic of concepts? Since
this logic strives for a complete characterization of concepts, it should not
leave out the objective deductions tied to concepts. Will these deductions be
derived from another characterization of concepts, or must we concentrate
on deductions directly?
One might suppose that a possible clue for connecting concepts with de-
ductions is provided by Go¨del’s views on the concept of absolute proof. A par-
ticularly telling remark concerning this matter is the following ([Wang 1996],
p. 188):
6.1.13 The concept of concept and the concept of absolute proof
may be mutually definable. . . .
It is however not clear that the notion of absolute proof is tied specifically
to deduction. It seems rather to be something that should supersede prov-
ability in a formal system, i.e. recursive enumerability. This is corrobo-
rated by Go¨del’s discussion of absolute provability in the introductory part
of [Go¨del 1946].
The concepts of extensional logic, concepts tied to the connectives, the
quantifiers and equality, involve deduction, according to what was said in
Section 3. According to what was said in Section 4, the same applies, in
the perspective of an infinite mind, to the concept set, another concept of
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extensional logic. Shouldn’t then that part of the logic of concepts that deals
with these concepts, the intensional logic of these concepts, if not of others,
involve deduction?
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